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In the Suprer11e Court of the 
State of Utah 
JOANN L. BAILEY, a widow, and 
TODD F. BAILEY, nrlnor son of 
FRANK DEE BAILEY, deceased, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
UTAH STATE INDUSTRIAL CO~IS­
SION and UTAH STATE INSURANCE 
FUN!D, 
~dants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
CASE 
NO. 10148 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
The apPellant appeals from an Order of tJhe Utah 
State Industrial Commission denying appellant's' COIVerage 
and workmen's compensation. 
DISPOSITION IN INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
Industrial Commission held that Frank Dee Bailey, 
deceased. was not acting within scope of his employment 
at time of his death on September 23, 1963. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant submits that the decision orf Industrial Com-
mission should be reversed and appellants awarded COIV-
erage under Workmen's Compensation Act. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the morndng of September 23, 1963, Frank Dee 
Bailey was killed while driving a vehicle tel Lehi, Utah. 
(R. 2). This accident occurred some 7/10 of a mile (R. 10) 
from Frank's American Oil Sltation, ·such business being 
solely owned and opel'ated by deceased. (R. 6). At the 
tirile·of tJhe accident he was driving a vehicle being charged 
off as a business asset (R. 20); was in American Oil uni-
form (R. 7); was carrying a brief case with records Of 
business, including daily inventory records (R. 8, 17) ; and 
was carrying the keys to the station. (R .9). 
The deceased often used the car in which he was rid-
ing to start other cars and carried battery cables for this 
purpose. (R. 8). He often left this car with a customer 
to use while servicing their vehicle. (R. 9A, 10, 20). De-
ceased also used vehicle to transport supplies for business. 
(R. 25). 
There is no dispute as to the ooverage or dependency 
Of a~ants. (R. 2). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE ENIDENCE ADDUCED AT ORIGINAL HEAR-
ING 'ESTABLISHED THAT FRANK DEE BAILEY, ID& 
CEASED, WAS IN COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT AT 
TIME OF DEATH. 
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This claim was filed rmder the provisions 35-1-45, U. 
C.A. 1953, which states that: 
"Every employee . . . who is injured and the depend-
ents of every such employee who is killed, by accident 
arising out of or in the course of his emplo:Yment . . . " 
(Emphasis OUrs) 
This section in the opinion of the claimant, has been 
broadened by the passage of 35-1-43, U.C.A. 1953 Pocket 
Supplement, which is worded as follows: 
14The words employee ... as used in this title, shall 
be construed to mean: 
(4) If the employer is a partnership, or sole pro-
prietorship, suoh employer may elect to include as an 
"employee" within the pro~ions of this act, any mem-
ber of such partnership, or the owner of the sole pro-
prietorship, devoting full time to the partnership or 
proprietorship business.'' (Enlphasis ours) 
As stated, it is the contention of this claimant that the 
new provision of the law covering sole proprietors creates 
an entirely new legislative directive which must be dealt 
with by the Commission in an entirely different light. In 
the past the Commission has seen fit to award compen-
sation to employees, who were employees in the strict sense, 
for injuries occurring off 1:Jhe actual plant premises. 
See cases in point: 
Bountiful Brick Co. v. Industrial Commission, 68 Utah 
600, 251 p 555. 
Kahn Brothers Co. v. Industrial Commission, 75 Utah 
145, 283 p 1054. 
Cudahay Packing Co. v. Industrial Commission, 60 
Utah 161, 207 P 148. 
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Other jurisdictions have gone further and broadened 
the gene,ral rule to c01ver situations where the employee 
was not involved in traveling upoo a normally used route 
for ingress and egress. These cases are fbund at 50 A.L.R. 
2d 401, some of the leading cases being: 
New York Casualty Co. v. Wefuevell, 19'3 Fed. 2d 881. 
Kobe v. Industrial Commission, 35 Cal. 2d 33, 215 p 
2d 736. 
However, the case upon which the claimant relies 
most heavily is the precedent established in Morgan v. In-
dustrial Commission, 92 Utah 129, 66 P 2d 144. In that 
case the injured employee was a school principal who went 
to t!he school building on a Sunday afternoon for purpose 
of returning a~ocount books and making· up a report due 
at the offioe of tile distritct secre'"tary. Upon reaching the 
building, he found that he had ler-t the keys to the building 
at home, retumed to his residence and there partook of 
his lunch and was then detained by guests at the home, 
and later :in the even1ng left the home to walk to the school 
and was injured en route. The oourt held in that case: 
"Those cases where a superior must largely di-
rect his OMlll orbit of work on behalf of his master are 
in a different category from the class in which an em-
ployee has a customary place to work and customary 
hours during which to work, and is under the orderrs 
of. anorther as to when and where he shall work . . . 
But even in the oases where there is a customary place 
and Cll.Sitomary hours to work, an employee on a spe-
cial e'rrand away from tlhe factory at the request of 
his employer is within the course of his. empl<zyment. 
An an accident oCCUTring on an evrand outside of hours 
specially or mainly for the employer is cornpe111Sable. 
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In this case, Morgan, being the principal of the 
school, was largely sui juris. His master was the school 
district but he gave orders for it. His time and place 
of work was somewhat subject to his own selection. 
When he was on a special errand wi1:1hin tJhe range of 
his duties by his own ordering, it was as if he had 
sent a te'dcher or the janitor on a special errand on 
school work . . . 
In the instant ease the claimant, hlmself a su-
perior, put himself "on duty" when he left the house 
to carl'y out tJhe purposes of his master on this special 
occasion. He was then in the course of his employ-
ment, which he would not have been had he been· leav-
ing his home to attach himself to his employment, 
the hours of which were blocked out by the school 
board . . . If the manager of a business, whose hours 
of work were largely self-imposed, left his house at 
night to meet a custome'r at a hotel on his master's 
business and was injured en route, he could recover 
compensation." 
It seems incomprehensible to me that in the instant 
case the Commission could hold that Mr. Bailey was not 
killed while traveling on a mission which grew out of his 
business. The deceased was driving a car owned by the 
business ( R. 20) ; used in its operation, attired in a dis-
tinctive uniform worn solely to perform his duties (R. 7); 
cruTied his brief case and reeords used in the business (R. 
8, 17); a set of keys to the station and its pumps. (R. 9). 
How can it be said that such trip did not grow ''out of" 
his employment? 
Would not a Judge be covered while driving to the 
court house? Or would not the Conunissioner be covered 
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while traveling to an Industrial Commission hearing in 
some distant city? 
Certainly the Commission and :the Oourt must broaden 
their e<mcept of course of emplo~ment when dealing with 
a sole proprietor who has chosen to be covered under the 
Workmen's Compensation Act as he is vested with the 
responsibility of opeTating his business, and the law re-
quires that it be ·on a full· time basis in order fur the cov-
erage to be propm'. 
Since Mr Bailey was a sole p~oprietor and owner of 
the business he could select, om any given occasion, to 
choose his own hours, to change the hours of the opera-
tiorn of rthe business, and his compensation and income was 
only deperu:lent upon his own initiative and :the number of 
hours he chose to devote to the operation of the concern. 
POINT II 
THAT THE COMl\llSSION WAS ARBITRARY IN 
PREVENTING OR DISSUADING APPELLANTS FROM 
PUTTING ON EVIDENCE IN COQVIMISSION HiEARING 
AND THAT SUCH ACTION WAS ARBITRARY. 
The Court has pointed out in numerous decisions, the 
most recent of which was a citation made in t!he case of 
Gary Wayne Harlan v. Ip.dustrial Commission of Utah, 
et al., No. 10026, which cites the case of Cooper v. Indus-
trial Commission, 15 Utah 2d 91, 387 P 2d 689 (1963) in 
which the Court held: 
''It is an elemental principai Qff justice that a par-
ty seeking adjudication of his rights should be neither 
prevented nor disSIUaded from presenting any evidence 
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he desires which is competent and material to the is-
sues.'' 
In the instant case the Commission disallowed the in-
troduction of the brief case, together with the records con-
tained therein, from being introduced in evidence. (R. 9). 
The Commission disallowed any evidence tending to show 
the habits of Mr. Bailey following his arising at his resi-
dence and ·before arriving at his station. (R. 17). 
The appellant contends tlhat the habits of Mr. Bailey 
would become pertinent in view of there being no support-
ing evidence as to his specific undertaking at the time of 
his death other than to preswne that he was following his 
normal habits. 
It is felt that such action upon the part of the Com-
mission is arbitrary ·and unreasonable and should justify 
rehearing. 
CONCLUSION 
It is submitted that there is sufficient evidence under 
the amended statute to find that the deceased, Frank Dee 
Bailey, was acting in ;the course of his employment even 
though not on ·the actual premises of his business. It is 
also submitted that the action of the Commission at the 
time of the original hearing was arbitrary and unreason-
able and this Court should allow rehearing if it is not found 
that the death occurred during the course of Mr. Bailey's 
employment. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HEBER GRANT IVINS 
Attorney for Appellant 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
